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Abstrasct: Romania's integration into the European Union requires, in addition to the complex 
process of policy transfer, learning new ways to make policies characteristic to a culture of a multi-
level governance and of partnerships. From the different levels of governance of the European 
model,  the  regional  level  ("regional  governance")  reflects  most  accurately,  in  our  opinion,  the 
complexity of reconfiguring the state's role in economy, at the beginning of this new millennium, in 
the European Union, and presents the greatest practical importance for Romania, as a new Member 
State in the European Union, as at the regional level structures are more flexible, and best practices 
more  quickly  assimilated.  The  selection  of  the  best  economic  policies  of  regional  growth  and 
development,  the  choice  of  objectives  from  a  number  of  competing  options,  the  calibration  of 
powers, roles, competences and responsibilities, in time and space, and the promotion of solutions 
of  the  win-win  type  require  resorting  to  and  combination  of  appropriate  and  effective  tools. 
Illustrative of the new context, the policy of regional growth and development must incorporate, in 
Romania as well, more knowledge, more creativity, new combinations of skills and new areas of 
expertise. This paper presents the preliminary results of the research related to a post-doctoral 
research  project:  "Economic  policies  for  regional  growth  and  development.  Challenges  for 
Romania in the context of economic-financial crisis and integration into the European model", 
developed  within  the  project  "Economic  scientific  research,  support  of  the  welfare  and  human 
development in the European context", financed during 2010-2013 from the European Social Fund 
(ESF) and implemented by the National Institute of Economic Research "Costin C. Kiri escu" of the 
Romanian Academy, from December 1, 2010, to November 30, 2012, coordinator: prof. Valeriu 
Ioan Franc, PhD. The question we intend to answer in the present stage of our research, based on 
the comparative analysis of the decentralization systems of several Member States of the European 
Union, as well as on the analysis of regional disparities existing at the European Union level and of 
the effects of economic integration, is - to what extent should the competences of the regional policy 
be concentrated in the hands of the regional authorities or of the European Union rather than to be 
left individually to the Member States so as they may develop their own regional policy? What we 
pursue in this paper, based on the analysis of experiences of decentralization of economic policy 
competences at the level of the European Union, is the identification of the regional implications of 
intermingling tendencies of decentralization, centralization, respectively supranationalization and, 
implicitly,  the  analysis  of  the  manner  of  reconfiguration  of  the  state’s  role  in  economy  at  the 
regional level, in the context of integration into the European model. The research into the manner 
of  reconfiguration  of  the  state’s  role  in  economy  at  a  regional  level  requires  a  review  of  the 
allocative, distributive and regulatory role of the state, from a the regional perspective, the analysis 
on the one hand, of the decentralization of economic policy competences from the national to the 
regional level (e.g. national level: provision of pure public goods, such as national defence and 
centralization of fiscal policy competences in order to achieve macroeconomic stability and income 
redistribution;  regional  level:  provision  of  mixed  public  goods,  such  as  waste  collection  and 
community police), on the other hand, centralization / supranationalization of regional competences 
at the level of the European Union. 
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regionalization, regional governance.  
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The concept of decentralization 
In  the  broad  sense  of  the  term, 
decentralization  means  the  transfer  of 
authority  or  responsibility,  duties  or 
competences from the level of central public 
administration  or  central  government  to  a 
lower level or from the public sector to the 
private  sector  or  to  non-governmental 
organizations. As defined by the World Bank, 
decentralization  means  “the  transfer  of 
authority  and  responsibility  for  public 
functions  from  the  central  government  to 
intermediate  and  local  governments  or 
quasi-independent  government 
organizations  and/or  the  private  sector” 
(The  World  Bank  Group,  2011).  As  the 
transfer of competences always involves the 
transfer of financial and human resources as 
well,  decentralization  raises  not  only 
problems of a political, administrative nature 
but also of economic, fiscal etc. Depending 
on the predominance of one or other of these 
aspects,  the  literature  marks  the  following 
forms  of  decentralization:  administrative 
(whose sub-forms in ascending order of the 
degree  of  decentralization  are: 
deconcentration,  delegation,  devolution), 
economic,  fiscal  and  political,  noting  that 
these forms are obviously interrelated. If the 
transfer of competences does not exceed the 
public sector, according to the lower level to 
which  the  duties  or  powers  are  transferred, 
one  can  speak  of  different  levels  of 
decentralization  -  territorial,  regional,  local 
level  etc.  If  the  transfer  of  powers  is  from 
public to private sector or to NGOs, we talk 
about privatization and denationalization.  
 
The reasons why decentralization is brought 
into  public  debate  and  implemented  are 
various. Widely debated in the literature, the 
reasons for decentralization can be classified, 
in our opinion, in three categories. The first 
category  is  related  to  malfunctions  of  the 
public  administration  or  of  the  central 
government which  leads to lack of response 
or  low  sensitivity  to  local  needs:  poor 
allocation of resources, public services absent 
or  defective  at  a  local  level,  inequities  of 
redistribution  at  the  territorial  level, 
blockages  in  the  central  decision  making; 
poor  planning  and  control  of  the  economic 
and  social  activities,  excessive  bureaucracy, 
low efficiency, flexibility and innovativeness 
of  public  policies;  low  quality  of  public 
services etc. Another category of reasons for 
decentralization  are  crises:  political  crises 
(ethnic  or  religious  conflicts,  difficult  post-
conflict  situations,  states  of  war  etc.),  or 
economic crises, implicitly  fiscal, budgetary 
crises  etc.  Finally,  reasons  for 
decentralization  are  also  represented  by 
transitions  from  authoritarian  political 
systems  to  democratic  systems,  from  the 
system of commanded economy to the market 
economy  etc.,  even  the  process  of  a  state’s 
integration into the European Union (EU) is a 
form of transition. 
 
Whatever,  though,  the  reasons  of 
decentralization,  it  is  widely  admitted  that 
politics is the driving force behind it (Eaton et 
al.,  2010).  The  typical  political  objectives 
pursued in the process of decentralization are 
to increase the capacity of political response 
and  to  broaden  participation  in  political, 
economic  and  social  activities  at  the 
territorial,  regional  or  local  level.  Whatever 
their form, size etc., decentralization requires 
a  change  in  the  institutional  rules  of 
distribution of resources and responsibilities 
between  different  levels  of  government, 
implicitly  changes  in  power  and  authority 
and, as highlighted by Kent Eaton, Kai Kaiser 
and Paul Smoke – as always when power and 
authority  are  at  stake  –  decentralization 
creates  controversy  and  heated  debate, 
regarding  the  justification  of  the  need  of  a 
decentralization  process,  the  objectives 
pursued,  the  reform  involved,  the  possible 
disadvantages etc. (Eaton et al., 2010). 
 
The debate about decentralization is not new. 
In the EU, subject to our analysis, in the last 
two  decades  of  the  last  century, 
decentralization was often put forward, on the 49 
one  hand,  as  a  result  of  the  crisis  of  the 
Welfare State, leading to various experiences 
of  reform  through  decentralization,  the 
transfer  of  competences  involved  being,  in 
this  case,  of  the  type  central-local  or 
nationalization-privatization,  on  the  other 
hand, as a consequence of the fragmentation 
of  the  power  of  the  nation-state  and 
reconfiguration  on  various  levels  of  the 
state’s role in the economy in the context of 
the process  of integration into EU (Dodescu, 
2011), further implying a transfer of powers 
of  the  central-regional  and  central-
supranational type.  
 
At  present,  under  the  economic-financial 
crisis,  the  reverse  phenomenon  of 
centralization  gains  ground,  confirming  the 
validity, on a long term, of the theories on the 
cyclicality  of  the  degree  of  the  state’s 
involvement  in  the  economy  (Dobrescu, 
1992),  on  the  “pendular  movement”  State-
Market  or  nationalization-denationalization 
(Dogan and Pelasy, 1992) or on the “political 
pendulum” that moves between the national-
transnational-global-European  arenas, 
depending on the relative attraction force of 
these magnetic fields (Wallace and Wallace, 
2000).  
 
In our opinion, as the days of the controversy 
State  versus  Market,  in  the  sense  of  the 
“mirror approach”, have passed, so has the 
time  of  the  polemic  Centralization  versus 
Decentralization.  Located  in  the  context  of 
globalization  and  instability,  the  debate  on 
decentralization  should  take  into 
consideration the change of governance levels 
and “locations” (Wallace and Wallace, 2000), 
the  increase  of  the  role  of  the  sub-national 
actors (Sharma, 2008, 2011). It is more likely 
the  “time”  of  networks,  partnerships, 
multitude of actors and interests. This trend is 
present both globally and at the EU level. As 
the  World  Bank  showed  in  its  reports,  an 
appropriate  balance  of  centralization  and 
decentralization is essential for effective and 
efficient  functioning  of  government.  This 
translates into balance in decentralization of 
functions  and  responsibilities,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  centralization  of  the  roles  of 
coordination  and  supervision,  on  the  other. 
The  combination  of  functions  resulting  – 
decentralized responsibilities with centralized 
roles of coordination and monitoring – should 
allow  strengthening  of  the  institutional 
capacity  at  a  local  level  and  effective 
management  of  decentralized  functions  in 
partnership  between  local  actors  -  local 
governments,  local  private  enterprises,  local 
NGOs  etc.  and  central  actors  involved  in 
planning, coordination etc. (The World Bank 
Group, 2011). Moreover, in the EU context – 
of  an  emphasis  on  the  role  of  networks  in 
developing and implementing policies, of an 
assertion of the “multi-level policy networks” 
(Börzel, 1997), unlike the traditional analysis 
of decentralization, focusing in particular on 
the  political,  administrative  and  fiscal 
dimensions, or on the provision of services, 
emphasis is on the interdependences between 
the levels concerned with decentralization, in 
particular,  respectively  on  the 
interdependences  between  actors  (partners, 
the  parties  interested  and  the  multipliers) 
involved (European Commission, 2007). 
 
We  next  undertake  is  to  analyse  the 
reconfiguration of state’s role in economy at 
a  regional  level,  in  the  economic  literature 
devoted to decentralization and in the context 
of the European model, in order to identify 
the  regional  implications  of  the 
interpenetration  of  the  tendencies  of 
decentralization,  centralization,  respectively 
supranationalization.  Consideration  on  how 
to reconfigure the state's role in economy at a 
regional level requires review of the state’s 
allocative,  distributive  and  regulatory  roles 
(Dodescu,  2000)  from  the  regional 
perspective, the analysis, on the one hand, of 
the decentralization from the national to the 
regional  level  (e.g.  national  level:  provision 
of  pure  public  goods,  such  as  national 
defence and fiscal policy and centralization of 
fiscal policy competences in order to achieve 50 
macroeconomic  stability  and  income 
redistribution; regional level: the provision of 
mixed public goods as for example, sewage 
collection  and  community  police),  on  the 
other  hand,  centralization  in  the  sense  of 
supranationalization, regional competences at 
the EU level. 
 
The economic approach of decentralization. 
Examination of the way of reconfiguring the 
state’s  allocative,  distributive  and  the 
regulatory role in economy at regional level 
 
The  economic  literature  dedicated  to 
decentralization  studies  the  impact  of 
different  types  of  decentralization  on 
efficiency,  equity  and/or  economic 
equilibrium  in  order  to  define  the  optimal 
level of government decentralization based on 
comparing the advantages and disadvantages 
of  different  solutions  for  decentralization. 
The  economic  objectives  pursued  in  the 
process  of  decentralization  of  production, 
distribution,  financing  etc.  of  goods  or 
services at regional or local level can coincide 
with  political  objectives  typical  for 
decentralization:  increased  political 
responsiveness  and  participation  at  the 
territorial,  regional  or  local  level.  As 
remarked by Kent Eaton, Kai Kaiser and Paul 
Smoke  –“fortunately,  the  decentralization 
may be one of those situations when politics 
and  economy  can  serve  the  same  purpose” 
(Eaton  et  al.,  2010).  This  statement  should 
not,  however,  lead  to  too  high  a  dose  of 
optimism. 
 
In  terms  of  classical  economic  theory,  the 
market  is  the  ultimate  form  of 
decentralization.  At  the  other  extreme,  one 
might consider that the state is automatically 
responsible  for  producing  and  distributing 
public  goods  or  services.  In  practice, 
however,  the  market  can  offer  often  more 
efficient  solutions  than  the  state  in  the 
production  or  distribution  of  public  goods. 
Also, local or regional solutions may be more 
effective than the central ones. On the other 
hand, still in practice, if not well chosen, local 
solutions can cause loss of economies of scale 
for public services, failure in the production, 
provision  of  public  services  due  to  low 
administrative  or  technical  capacity  at  local 
level.  Clearly,  we  are  talking  here  of  the 
state’s allocative role and of the objective of 
efficient  resources  allocation.  At  the  same 
time,  by  decentralization  the  equitable 
distribution  may  be  affected  by  providing 
social  services  that  prove  inadequate  or  do 
not reach all those “in need”. The cause may 
be  the  transfer  of  responsibilities  without 
adequate financial resources. In this case, we 
talk  about  the  state’s  distributive  role  and 
about the objective of social equity. Finally, 
the state’s regulatory role subordinated to the 
objective  of  economic  equilibrium  can  be 
affected when, for example, the coordination 
of economic policies moves from the hands 
of  central  government  to  the  hands  of 
regional government and this fact deteriorates 
the credit conditions and the possibilities to 
cover budget deficits at regional level or to 
the  hands  of  local  government  and  this 
transfer gives way to corruption at local level.  
 
In terms of theory, there are some established 
principles  underlying  decentralization,  a 
fugitive foray into their world being based on 
Stigler’s principles (1957) that the decision-
making should be placed at the lowest level 
of  government  in  accordance  with  the 
objective  of  the  efficient  allocation  of 
resources,  the  degree  of  decentralization 
being  determined  by  the  extent  of  the 
economies of scale and the effects of the type 
“spill-over”  (benefits-costs);  on  Olson’  s 
principle, characteristic to the Public Choice 
School,  whereby  small  groups  of  powerful 
interests  are  more  efficient  in  absorbing 
public  funds  (Olson,  1969),  on  Oates’s 
theorem  of  decentralization  according  to 
which  every  public  service  should  be 
provided at that level of government that has 
control  over  the  minimum  geographic  area 
able  to  internalize  the  corresponding  costs 
and benefits (Oates, 1972), on the principle of 51 
subsidiarity  as  set  by  the  Maastricht  Treaty 
(1992),  whose  purpose  is  to  ensure  that 
decisions  in  the  EU  are  taken  at  a  level  as 
close  to  the  citizens  as  possible.  The 
theoretical  perspectives  according  to  which 
the decentralization issue is addressed are: the 
traditional  fiscal  federalism  and  The  New 
Public  Management  -  which  focus  their 
attention  on  the  so-called  “market  failures” 
and  on  the  ability  to  deliver  public  goods 
efficiently  and  equitably,  the  Public  Choice 
School  and  the  Economic  Institutionalism  - 
which  focus  on  “government  failures”, 
respectively  the  approach  of  the  “network 
governance” type (Shah, 2006). 
 
Defining  government  decentralization, 
considered  economically,  as  a  process  of 
transfer and distribution of state duties in the 
field of public expenditure and revenue, from 
national to local or regional level, we try to 
point  out  the  specific  aspects  of 
decentralization, at a regional level, in terms 
of  the  three  roles  of  the  State:  allocative, 
distributive and regulatory. 
 
a).  Regional  decentralization  and  optimal 
allocation of resources 
 
In  what  the  the  state’s  allocative  role  is 
concerned,  the  analysis  of  the  regional 
decentralization focuses mainly on collective 
goods  (public)  goods.  According  to  the 
current  acceptation  regarding  a  democratic 
state,  the  number  of  collective  goods 
produced centrally needs to decrease and to 
be restricted mainly to pure collective goods: 
army, security, foreign policy, justice etc. Not 
all  collective  goods,  however,  must  be 
decentralized in the same way or at the same 
level.  The  state’s  role  (of  the  central 
government)  and  the  limits  of 
decentralization in ensuring the provision of 
collective goods depend, first, on the nature 
of these goods and services, on the economies 
of scale affecting the technical efficiency and 
on the extent of the spillover effects, beyond 
jurisdictional boundaries, and on the structure 
of  competition  in  producing  or  delivering  a 
particular public good or service. Therefore, 
choosing a  solution of  decentralization  or  a 
combination  of  solutions  such  as 
decentralized  -  managed  competition  - 
privatization  etc.  starts  from  the  assessment 
of  the  lowest  level  of  governmental 
organization,  at  which  the  public  good  or 
service  can  be  produced  and  delivered 
effectively, or of the most appropriate forms 
of  privatization  (The  World  Bank  Group, 
2011).  
 
The  possibilities  of  decentralization  of 
collective goods supply depends primarily on 
their  effect  of  overflow  (spatial  opening  of 
their  externalities),  respectively  on  the  non-
rivalry of their consumption (the possibility 
of  their  being  used  by  a  large  number  of 
people without an additional production cost; 
a  person’s  consumption  doesn’t  reduce  by 
anything the amount available for all others, 
and is therefore non-rival to the consumption 
of others), respectively non-exclusion of their 
consumption (implies that the supplier of the 
collective good is unable to exclude someone 
from  the  consumption  of  these  goods 
reserving that right to those who will pay a 
price, so, once produced, the collective good 
is  available  to  all,  free  of  charge).  While 
some collective goods are only beneficial in 
the vicinity of the geographical area of their 
place  of  production  (local  police,  street 
lighting,  coastal  lighthouse  for  navigation, 
traffic lights etc.), others have a wider spatial 
opening of their externalities - regional (road 
or  rail  transport,  postal  service, 
telecommunications, higher education etc.) or 
national (national defence, justice etc.). The 
first  category  -  local  collective  goods  -  is 
consumed exclusively at the level of a local 
community.  The  indivisible  nature  of  these 
goods  and  their  optional  use  create 
redistributive externalities (for example, those 
who  never  go  out  at  night  bear  the  cost  of 
lighting  public  without  having  a  benefit  in 
exchange), but these do not go beyond local 
boundaries,  existing  the  possibility  to 52 
"internalize"  them  at  a  local  level,  the 
production in an optimal quantity at the local 
community  level being possible without the 
externalities  affecting  neighbouring 
communities.  In  contrast,  there  are  national 
collective  goods,  whose  benefits  are  shared 
equally  among  all  inhabitants  of  a  country. 
The most illustrative example is the national 
defence, for which the risks and externalities 
of a possible decentralization are obvious for 
communities not large enough to internalize 
externalities.  Between  the  two  extremes  we 
can  fit  the  regional  collective  goods  whose 
externalities extend beyond local boundaries, 
but  which  are  consumed  unevenly. 
Decentralization of their offer is only possible 
if the region is large enough to internalize the 
effects  of  an  overflow,  with  the  risk  of 
insufficient  supply,  while  centralization  of 
their offer involves a uniformity that neglects 
the  regional  differences  between  the  tastes 
and  needs  of  the  population,  causing 
allocational  and  redistributive  externalities. 
(Atkinson  and  Stiglitz,  1980;  Brown  and 
Jackson,  1990;  Weber,  1991;  Black  et  al., 
2009). 
 
b).  Regional  decentralization  and  equitable 
distribution 
 
From  the  perspective  of  the  state’s 
distributive  role,  regional  decentralization 
should be analyzed according to its potential 
impact on the choice of domicile (emigration 
/ immigration) and on the firms’ location. If, 
for example, a regional government decides 
to operate a redistribution effort much higher 
than  that  of  the  neighbouring  community, 
applying  a  very  progressive  taxation,  the 
community at stake will face a phenomenon 
of emigration of people receiving an income 
higher  than  average  to  communities  with 
lighter  taxation  coupled  with  an  opposite 
phenomenon,  the  immigration  of  the  poor. 
Similarly,  there  may  be  a  phenomenon  of 
delocalisation  of  firms.  For  the  community 
concerned  this  policy  will  therefore  have  a 
boomerang effect, because it will increase its 
costs  and  diminish  its  revenue  at  the  same 
time. Consequently, the national competence 
on  the  redistribution  plan  depends  on  the 
level  of  the  following  parameters:  the 
amplitude of the redistributive correction; the 
disparity  of  the  redistribution  efforts 
undertaken by neighbouring communities, the 
spatial  mobility  of  economic  agents.  The 
reduced mobility of economic agents or the 
strong attachment of individuals or firms to a 
region  can  counterbalance  this  boomerang 
effect.  Therefore,  decentralization  of 
redistributive  policy  determines,  with  the 
price of a greater vertical equity, a horizontal 
inequity,  the  decentralization  chances  being 
small and dependent on the spatial mobility 
of  the  economic  agents,  on  the  size  and 
homogeneity  of  the  regional  community,  in 
order  to  practice,  within  certain  limits,  an 
active policy of redistribution (Atkinson and 
Stiglitz,  1980;  Brown  and  Jackson,  1990; 
Weber, 1991; Black et al., 2009). 
 
c).  Regional  decentralization  and  economic 
equilibrium 
 
From the perspective of the state’s regulatory 
role,  the  regional  decentralization  analysis 
must start from the indisputable fact that the 
economic  equilibrium  shows  the 
characteristics of a national collective good, 
due to the spatial openness of its externalities. 
Even though their intensity varies from one 
region  to  another,  the  fluctuations  in 
economic  activity  and  the  economic 
imbalances concern the national economy as 
a whole, therefore, the decentralization of the 
stabilization  policy  increases  the  risk  that  a 
region  shall  benefit  from  the  stabilization 
effort  of  others  without  doing  anything  in 
exchange. On the other hand, the impact of 
regional stabilization policy is the weaker for 
the region concerned, the more open it is, the 
multiplier effect being only partial, because a 
part  of  the  induced  demand  addresses  a 
production  made  outside  the  region, 
respectively,  the  higher  national  capital 
mobility is, which deteriorates the conditions 53 
of loan at a regional level and the possibilities 
to  cover  budget  deficits  (Atkinson  and 
Stiglitz,  1980;  Brown  and  Jackson,  1990; 
Weber, 1991; Black et al., 2009).  
 
In conclusion, the analysis of decentralization 
at a regional level in terms of the three roles 
of the state, according to the theory of fiscal 
federalism, leads to a rather simple allocation 
scheme - the distributive and regulatory role 
are preferable at a central level, the allocative 
role  being  shareable  or  possible  to 
decentralize  in  accordance  with  the  spatial 
openness  of  the  externalities  of  collective 
goods, respectively with the characteristics of 
non-rivalry  and  non-exclusion  of  their 
consumption. 
 
Decentralization at the regional level in the 
EU. Trends 
 
The decentralization of the responsibilities of 
governments in the EU must be considered in 
the context of the fiscal federalism and of the 
subsidiarity  principle,  according  to  the 
provision  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  The 
theory  of  traditional  fiscal  federalism 
involves  an  administrative  organization 
structured on three levels: federal, state, local 
and,  implicitly,  a  division  of  fiscal 
responsibilities between the three levels. The 
specificity of the EU - as an entity that tends 
to become a federal state is linked to adding 
the regional level to  the three levels of  the 
theory of traditional fiscal federalism. Thus, 
at present, in the EU there are the following 
levels of government: union, national states, 
regions,  local  authorities  (usually  counties 
and municipalities).The allocation of powers 
at the appropriate level in accordance with the 
principle  of  subsidiarity  stipulated  by  the 
Treaty  of  Maastricht  answers  to  criticisms 
about the many overlaps between the upper 
and lower levels and to the heterogeneity of 
the  administrative  arrangements  from  a 
Member State to another, hence a tendency of 
supranationalization  of  competences  of  the 
national  states  (governments)  manifesting 
simultaneously  at  the  EU  level,  along  with 
the  decentralization  of  some  of  their  other 
competences  to  lower  levels  (regional  and 
local).  The  principle  of  subsidiarity  is 
intended  to  ensure  that  decision-making  in 
the European Union is as closer to the citizen 
as possible and to validate the need for action 
at  community  level  considering  the 
possibilities existing at national, regional or 
local  level.  According  to  The  Treaty  of 
Maastricht  (Article  3b)  “The  Community 
shall  act  within  the  powers  conferred  and 
objectives  assigned  to  it  by  this  Treaty.  In 
areas not within its exclusive competence, the 
Community  shall  take  no  action,  in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity 
only  if  and  insofar  as  the  objectives  of  the 
proposed  action  cannot  be  achieved 
satisfactorily by the Member States, but can 
be better achieved at community level due to 
the  extent  or  the  effects  of  the  proposed 
action.”  Relative  to  the  state’s  roles  in  the 
context of fiscal federalism and subsidiarity 
principle,  according  to  the  provision  of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty,  the  supranational 
(European)  level  is  in  charge  with 
coordinating  the  stabilization  policy,  its 
management  being  a  competence  of  the 
Member  States,  and  with  coordinating  the 
territorial  redistribution  so  as  to  ensure  that 
all regions of the EU offer equal opportunities 
and  uniform  provisions  of  certain  basic 
services,  the  Member  States  and  the  local 
communities  maintaining  their 
responsibilities  for  managing  social  policy 
and  income  redistribution  to  suit  the 
preferences of each community (Oates, 2001; 
Majocchi,  2008).  Therefore,  the  regulatory 
role  is  centralized  and  shared  between  the 
national  level  (management)  and 
supranational  (coordination),  the  distributive 
role is mostly centralized and shared between 
the  national  level  (management)  and 
supranational  (coordination)  and 
decentralized  at  a  regional  and  local  level, 
depending on the possibilities to meet local 
community  preferences.  Regarding  the 
allocative role, as already  noted, this is the 54 
one  that  best  meets  the  requirements  of 
decentralization,  depending  on  the 
characteristics  of  the  collective  goods,  at  a 
supranational  level,  here  concentrating  all 
efforts  to  strengthen  the  internal,  single 
market.  
 
Practically,  the European Union’s vision on 
the policy implementation is a decentralized 
one,  of  the  “network”  type,  of  a  non-
hierarchical  nature,  and  involving  sub-
national, national and supranational actors. 
Following  the  debates  within  the  European 
Union,  on  “European  governance”,  starting 
from  the  White  Paper  on  European 
Governance,  adopted  in  July  2001,  which 
defines clearly the five levels of governance: 
global,  European,  national,  regional  and 
local  (European  Commission,  2001)  and 
describes the geographical decentralization of 
the EU policy and the sharing of powers and 
responsibilities  of  the  type  EU  -  member 
states  -  regions  (European  Commission, 
2002),  continuing  with  the  debate  on  the 
Future of Europe, the European Constitution 
and the Lisbon Treaty and, more recently, the 
2020  Strategy,  one  can  clearly  notice  the 
increase  in  the  capacity  of  supranational 
regulation along with the decentralization of 
powers  of  economic  policy  at  a  regional 
level, the implementation of the principle of 
subsidiarity and the emphasis of the role of 
networks  in  developing  and  implementing 
European  policies  (European  Commission, 
2001, 2003a, 2005, 2007, 2010).  
 
However,  beyond  the  complexity  of  the 
process  of  transformation  of  the  “European 
governance”  into  a  “network  type 
governance” (Dodescu, 2011), in terms of a 
future  federal  state,  the  tendency  of 
supranationalization  merely  means  an 
increase  in  the  EU  powers,  it  being  added 
with further performance of the three roles of 
the  national  state  described  by  the  public 
economy:  allocative  role  (currently  seen  in 
terms  of  strengthening  the  internal  market 
and  in  view  of  the  federal  state,  including 
defence,  research  and  development  and 
European transport network etc.), distributive 
role  (social  protection  and  struggle  against 
poverty),  the  regulatory  role  (the 
coordination  of  macroeconomic  policy 
aiming at stability at the Union level). With a 
view to the European federal state, the roles 
of  national  governments  are  simplified, 
comprising  the  legal  framework,  ensuring 
public  order,  national  infrastructure,  public 
administration,  regional  distribution,  public 
loans  etc.,  while  education,  health,  local 
transportation  and  other  services  of  local 
interest  will  be  responsibilities  of  local 
governments.  
 
Decentralization  at  a  regional  level  in  the 
EU. Experiences 
 
In  the  EU  states,  the  regional  level  covers 
different political and administrative realities, 
being  the  result  of  a  process  of 
decentralization that combines the specificity 
of organization of state power in relation to 
the  territory  and  the  historical  evolution  of 
that state, to the requirement imposed by the 
EU  of  the  existence  of  a  sub-national 
administrative level but higher than the local 
one. For the EU, the need of a regional level 
is linked, primarily, to the implementation of 
financial  assistance  given  by  the  regional 
policy,  secondly,  to  the  prospect 
transformation of the EU into a federal state 
and the high degree of autonomy granted to 
this level within federalism.  
 
From  the  perspective  of  historical 
developments of the European states, of how 
nation-states  were  formed,  federalism, 
however, is rather an exception than a rule, 
Switzerland, Germany (established in the 19
th 
century), Austria and Belgium (established in 
the  20
th  century,  in  1920,  respectively  in 
1993) being the only federal states in Europe. 
Most  European  countries  were  founded  as 
and are up to now unitary states. Obviously, 
in  the  EU,  the  regional  level  enjoys  the 
greatest  autonomy  and  knows  the  fastest 55 
growth  within  the  federal  states  (Germany, 
Austria,  Belgium)  or  regional  (Spain,  Italy 
and, in some parts of the territory, in Great 
Britain and Portugal) - intermediate structures 
between the federal and unitary state. For the 
opposite,  the  regional  level  has  a  reduced 
autonomy,  existing  only  for  administrative 
reasons  or  as  a  response  to  the  need  of 
implementing the EU regional policy within 
the  unitary  states  (France,  Netherlands, 
Greece, Ireland etc.). 
 
The administrative-territorial structure of the 
EU  Member  States  is  extremely 
heterogeneous  and  comprises  generally  a 
local  level  (towns,  villages)  and  two  main 
regional  levels  structured,  organized  and 
named  differently  from  country  to  country, 
for  example,  “Lander”  and  “Kreise”  in 
Germany, “Regions” and “Departaments” in 
France, “Standard regions” and “Counties” in 
the  UK,  “Regioni”  and  “Provincie”  in  Italy 
etc. The launch of the regional policy of the 
EC  in  1975  met  the  impossibility  of 
comparative  assessment  of  the  economic 
situation  in  different  regions  as  a  basis  for 
Community  intervention  to  correct  regional 
imbalances. Therefore, to ensure comparable 
statistics  at  European  level,  the  EU  has 
developed  and  regulated  The  Nomenclature 
of  Territorial  Units  for  Statistics  (NUTS) 
(European Commission, 2003), a standard of 
geographical  coding  regarding  subdivisions 
of the States defined for statistical purposes, 
instrumental in the mechanism of allocation 
of structural funds. NUTS establishes in each 
Member  State  at  least  three  hierarchical 
levels:  NUTS  1  (“Gewesten    /  Regions”  in 
Belgium,  “Länder”  in  Germany, 
“Continente”, “Região dos Açores”, “Região 
da  Madeira”  in  Portugal,  “Scotland,  Wales, 
Northern  Ireland”,  “Government  Office 
Regions  of  England”  in  the  UK),  NUTS  2 
(“Provincies  /  Provinces”  in  Belgium, 
“Regierungsbezirke”  in  Germany, 
“Periferies”  in  Greece,  “Comundidades  y 
ciudades autónomas” in Spain, “Régions” in 
France,  “Regions”  in  Ireland,  “Regioni”  in 
Italy,  “Provincies”  in  the  Netherlands, 
“Länder”  in  Austria),  NUTS  3 
(“Arrondissements”  in  Belgium, 
“Amtskommuner”  in  Denmark;  “Kreise  / 
kreisfreie  Städte”  in  Germany,  “Nomoi”  in 
Greece,  “Provincias”  in  Spain, 
“Départements”  in  France,  “Regional 
authority regions” in Ireland, “Provincie” in 
Italy,  “Län”  in  Sweden,  “Maakunnat  / 
landskapen”  in  Finland).  The  heterogeneity 
continues at the level lower than NUTS 3 as 
well,  of  the  ‘small  administrative  units’: 
“Gemeenten  /  Communes”  in  Belgium, 
“Kommuner”  in  Denmark,  “Gemeinden”  in 
Germany,  “Demoi  /  Koinotites”  in  Greece, 
“Municipios”  in  Spain,  “Communes”  in 
France,  “Counties  /  County  boroughs”  in 
Ireland, “Comuni” in Italy, “Communes” in 
Luxembourg,  “Gemeenten”  in  the 
Netherlands,  “Gemeinden”  in  Austria, 
“Freguesias”  in  Portugal,  “Kunnat  / 
Kommuner”  in  Finland,  “Kommuner”  in 
Sweden  and  “Wards”  in  the  UK  etc. 
(European Commission, 2003b, 2008, 2011).  
 
Therefore, for the European Union, the need 
for choosing a standard unit, as the basic unit 
for its regional policy is more than obvious. It 
was  elected  the  development  region  - 
standard unit with an average size of 13,000 
square  kilometres  and  a  population  of 
approximately 2.5 million inhabitants, i.e. the 
intermediate level – NUTS 2. According to 
the  EC,  the  development  region  should  not 
necessarily have an administrative character, 
but  it  was  compulsorily  created  in  all  EU 
Member  States  in  order  to  allow 
comparability,  harmonization  of  regional 
statistics  of  member  countries,  performance 
of analyses at a regional level within the EU 
and  elaboration  of  Community  regional 
strategies,  policies  and  programs.  The 
competition  to  attract  structural  funds 
triggered in time, as, in fact, the EC foresaw 
initially,  a  tendency  to  amplify  competition 
not  so  much  between  Member  States,  but 
between  regions  of  the  same  state  or  of 
different states, led to the occurrence of new 56 
regional  actors  such  as  associations  of 
regions, independent from the national states, 
and of the phenomenon of regional lobby. At 
Community level, the emergence in 1985 of 
the  Assembly  of  European  Regions,  and  in 
1992,  by  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht,  of  the 
Committee of the Regions, are clear elements 
in promoting and strengthening the status of 
regions. 
 
Far from being able to speak about regions as 
homogeneous entities in the EU, although the 
definition  of  region  is  not  a  subject  of  this 
paper, we shall however note the existence of 
numerous  critical  voices  which  argue  that 
there  still  is  no  operational  definition  of 
region,  from  a  political,  juridical  and 
administrative point of view, at the EU level, 
that the region is not yet and will not be any 
time  soon  at  a  general  level  in  the  EU,  an 
administrative-territorial entity endowed with 
political representativeness. Therefore, at the 
EU level, the regional decentralization can be 
described  better  watching  the  process  of 
regionalization,  which  according  to  the 
typology of particular State, may be linked to 
existing  regions  as  administrative-territorial 
units  or  regions  created  as  new  territorial 
divisions.  Analysing  comparatively  the 
regionalization  as  a  process  aimed  at 
developing  regions  as  entities  located 
immediately  below  the  central  state  and 
above the local (sub-national and supra-local) 
in  the  27  EU  Member  States  (Chirle an, 
2007;  Diez,  2006;  Stănciulescu  and 
Androniceanu,  2006;  Androniceanu  and 
Stănciulescu, 2001), we can distinguish five 
types of regionalization, as follows: 
 
a).  Administrative  regionalization  (easy 
administrative  decentralization  -  by 
deconcentration)  is  the  type  of 
regionalization resulted from the transfer by a 
state  to  local  authorities  or  bodies  directly 
subordinated  to  the  central  government  of 
certain  tasks  regarding  the  promotion  of 
regional  economic  development  by 
mobilizing local communities and economic 
organizations.  In  most  cases,  administrative 
regionalization  is  a  response  to  the  need  to 
implement  the  EU  regional  policy.  The 
administrative regionalization characterizes at 
present, at the EU level, as a rule, the unitary 
states. Among the EU15 Member States, we 
can  note  Greece  (where  13  administrative 
regions were formed, responsible for regional 
development,  led  by  a  secretary  general  of 
the region assisted by an Advisory Regional 
Council consisting of representatives of local 
communities,  in  each  administrative  region 
existing  a  so-called  House  of  regional 
development),  Portugal  (where  there  were 
formed  five  regional  coordinating 
commissions  responsible  for  the 
implementation of the regional development 
plan under the authority of government), the 
UK,  except  Scotland  (known  as  a 
“centralised  model”  characterized  rather  by 
tendencies  of  centralizing  than  of 
decentralizing,  the  importance  given  to  the 
regional  level  began  to  increase  after  the 
recognition  of  the  political-administrative 
autonomy  of  Scotland,  Wales  and  Northern 
Ireland) and Sweden (the regional level has 
rather little relevance as compared to the local 
level, traditionally very strong in the “state of 
consensus”,  the  administrative 
regionalization  appears here  under  the  form 
of  delegating  attributions  of  regional 
development  to  a  district  governor  assisted 
by  an  Administration  Board  in  which  local 
interests are represented; in addition, regional 
competences  include,  primarily,  the 
management  of  health  services  and  of  the 
system  of  education).  The  administrative 
decentralization  also  characterized  the 
following  New  Member  States:  Bulgaria, 
Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Slovakia  and 
Slovenia  and  knows  also  a  great  variety  of 
forms. For example, in Estonia there is only 
one Estonian Regional Development Agency, 
the  administrative  regionalization  is  not 
reflected  by  the  existence  of  administrative 
units or administrative regions, but by the fact 
that  state's  regional  development  policy  is 
implemented  in  the  15  districts  by  a 57 
governor,  in  Lithuania  –  the  policy  of 
territorial planning and regional development 
is managed by a governor at the level of the 
higher  administrative  units  of  provinces  / 
departments, in Slovakia there are 8 regions 
and  8  offices  of  regional  administration 
responsible  for  coordinating  the  activity  of 
the  local  communities  in  terms  of  regional 
development.  Luxembourg  falls  into  this 
category as a particular case; due to the small 
size of the state, the four regions created do 
not need own institutions.  
 
b).  Regionalization  by  cooperation  between 
existing  local  collectivities  (average 
administrative  decentralization  -  by 
delegation) is the type of regionalization by 
the agency of decentralized institutions within 
the local authorities,  the functions of central 
government  in  the  field  of  regional 
development being taken by the existing local 
collectivities.  Unlike  administrative 
regionalization,  regionalization  through 
existing local collectivities supposes effective 
transfer  of  competences  from  central 
government  to  the  regions  created  as 
institutionalized  forms  of  cooperation 
between territorial collectivities. This type of 
regionalization  is  limited  both  in  terms  of 
resources  and  of  competences  and 
institutions.  At  the  EU  level,  this  type  of 
regionalization  characterizes  the  unitary 
states – Denmark (14 provincial communes), 
 Finland  (20  regional  councils  and  the  so-
called  unions  of  communes),  Ireland  (8 
regional  authorities  and  several  specialized 
agencies) and – from the New Member States 
–  Romania  (8  development  regions 
established by law, by voluntary cooperation 
of the counties, without legal personality and 
not  being  administrative-territorial  units,  a 
Regional Development Agency existing at the 
level each of them) and Hungary (originally 
there were created 8 administrative regions, 
which  were  abandoned  in  1994,  their 
functions being taken over by the provinces, 
which may cooperate voluntarily  with other 
provinces  through  regional  development 
councils).  There  is  a  particular  case  - 
Germany,  a  federal  state  characterized  by 
internal administrative regionalization at the 
level of the lands (cooperation between local 
collectivities within the lands). 
 
c).  Regional  decentralization  (advanced 
administrative  decentralization  and  average 
economic  and  fiscal  decentralization) 
supposes  the  formation  of  regions  as  new 
territorial  collectivities  superior  to  the 
existing ones, whose competences regard the 
regional  development.  This  type  of 
regionalization  involves  changing  the 
administrative organization of the territory by 
the  emergence  of  a  new  territorial-
administrative  category  -  the  region,  of  the 
same juridical form as the existing ones, but 
which is part of the constitutional order of a 
unitary  state.  This  type  of  regionalism  is 
characterized  by  the  absence  of  legislative 
power,  administrative  competence  extended 
to fields related to regional development and 
fiscal power that varies from case to case. At 
the  EU  level,  this  form  of  regionalization 
characterized  France  (“unitary  state  in  the 
process of decentralization”, France currently 
has  25  regions,  constituted  as  autonomous 
communities, as a result of decentralization of 
public administration and benefiting from the 
principle  of  free  administration  of  local 
authorities, led by a Regional Council elected 
by  universal,  direct  vote,  the  competences 
transferred  to  the  regions  following  the 
decentralization  process  were  the  territorial 
planning,  the  professional  training  and  the 
transportation  infrastructure),  Sweden 
(characterized  by  a  strong tradition  of  local 
autonomy, has 20 regions, led by a regional 
government  that  implements  the  policies 
decided by the government, which have their 
own  competence  in  managing  municipal 
hospitals) and as for the New Member States 
- Poland (16 provinces, whose leader controls 
the  respective  local  community),  the  Czech 
Republic  (the  formation,  under  the 
Constitution,  of  territorial  collectivities  of  a 
higher level, in the form of 3 regions).  58 
d).  Political  regionalization  (political 
decentralization  or  the  so-called  “regional 
autonomy”)  adds  legislative  power  to  the 
regional  decentralization.  The  regions  have 
legislative  power  exercised  by  a  regional 
assembly  and  in  order  to  exercise 
competences  an  executive  body  is 
constituted,  which  has  the  features  of  a 
regional government. The competences of the 
region are much broader in this case and are 
defined and guaranteed by the Constitution of 
the  unitary  state.  The  regions  are  not 
countries and do not have a Constitution and 
usually do not participate in the exercise of 
legislative  national  power  by  their  own 
representation.  This  type  of  regionalization 
affects the state’s structures. In the EU, it is 
characteristic to the so-called regional states - 
 characterizing  the  whole  territory  in  Spain 
(the  right  of  autonomy  of  the  regions  is 
recognized  and  guaranteed  by  the  Spanish 
Constitution – the state’s structure is based on 
the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation 
and also on the recognition and guarantee of 
the  right  of  the  regions’  autonomy),  Italy 
(under  the  Constitution  of  Italy,  the  Italian 
Republic, unique and indivisible, recognizes, 
at the same time, the autonomy of the regions 
by  adapting  legislative  principles  and 
methods to the requirements of autonomy and 
decentralization, the regions have the power 
to  adopt  primary  legislation  and  enjoy 
financial autonomy) or only certain parts of 
the territory in the UK (Scotland in particular) 
and  Portugal  (the  islands).  This  type  of 
regionalization  does  not  characterize, 
currently, any of the New Member States.  
 
e).  Regionalization  by  federal  authorities 
(federalization) is characteristic to the federal 
states, which were born as unions of states, 
therefore, the regions, in this case, are states, 
political  entities,  which  have  a  series  of 
regional and ethnic features. Unlike political 
regionalization  characterized  by  an 
asymmetry  of  institutions  and  competences, 
the  federal  state  supposes  equality  in  the 
rights of the member states. At the EU level, 
this  form  of  regionalization  characterizes 
Germany,  Austria  and  Belgium.  While  the 
building of the modern state in Germany and 
Austria  was  done  through  federalism,  in 
Belgium regionalism led to the federalization 
of the state, in order to allow the formation of 
a structure that shall ensure greater autonomy 
to the component units (the case of Flanders), 
which will progressively accede to the quality 
of  a  state.  The  model  of  federalism  that 
characterizes Germany is called cooperative 
federalism  in  which  power  is  distributed 
among  three  levels:  federal,  statal  (Länder) 
and local (regions, cities and communes), the 
relations between these levels being relations 
of  cooperation  dominated  by  the  idea  of 
“administrative  intermingling”  of  tasks  and 
competences. From a fiscal point of view, all 
territorial  levels  participate  to  the  tax 
collection to the extent to which they are also 
responsible for the expenses. As in Germany, 
in  Austria  the  lands  benefit  from  more 
competences  and  resources,  their  main 
function being the implementation of public 
policies, with the distribution of competences 
between the federation and the lands and the 
strengthening  of  the  lands’  position  being 
permanently debated.  
 
Obviously, this last form of regionalization, 
due to its high level of decentralization and 
territorial autonomy, answers better, in terms 
of  functionality  and  stability,  to  the 
complexity  of  European  governance,  the 
functional  adaptations  on  levels 
(supranational  -  federal  -  state  -  regional  - 
local) are more easily absorbed by the federal 
structures. This leads, however, to a series of 
wrong  approaches,  the  federalism  being 
considered an expression of regionalization or 
a response to regionalism as opposite to the 
Nation-State. The main concern in the EU is 
that  the  combination  of  federalism  and 
regionalization  affects  the  territorial 
integrity. 
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Conclusions and future concerns 
What we aimed at in the start of this approach 
-  a  comparative  analysis  of  the  experiences 
and  tendencies  of  decentralization  at  a 
regional level in the EU - led us to formulate 
the following conclusions:  
·  In the EU countries, the regional level 
covers  various  political  and 
administrative realities, being the result 
of  a  process  of  decentralization  that 
combines  the  specificity  of  the 
organization  of  the  state’s  power  in 
relation to the territory and the historical 
evolution of that state with the European 
Union’s  requirement,  that  of  the 
existence  of  an  administrative  level 
inferior to the national level but higher 
than the local one.  
·  The regional decentralization, typical to 
France, and embraced by Poland and the 
Czech Republic, from the New Member 
States, is an exception rather than a rule 
in the EU.  
·  At  the  EU  level,  the  regional 
decentralization  can  best  be  described 
following the process of regionalization 
which, depending on the typology of a 
certain  state,  may  be  related  to  the 
regions  existing  as  administrative-
territorial units or to the regions created 
as new territorial divisions.  
·  The  most  common  type  of 
regionalization  in  the  EU27  is  the 
administrative  regionalization  (Greece, 
Portugal,  United  Kingdom  except 
Scotland,  Sweden,  Bulgaria,  Estonia, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Slovakia,  Slovenia), 
followed by the regionalization through 
existing  local  collectivities  (Denmark, 
Finland,  Ireland,  Romania  and 
Hungary),  which  represent  rather 
functional  responses  to  the  EU’s 
requirements  in  order  to  allow 
absorption of funds allocated under the 
regional policy.  
·  The  more  advanced  forms  of 
regionalization  -  regionalization  by 
federal  authorities  and  political 
regionalization  -  characterize  only  7 
Member  States  of  the  EU:  Germany, 
Austria,  Belgium,  Spain  and  Italy, 
Portugal  (for  the  islands)  and  United 
Kingdom (for Scotland). 
·  The  relationship  federalism  - 
regionalization  responds  better  to  the 
European  governance  of  the  network 
type and of the multi-level type. 
·  The expansion of regionalization in the 
EU  is  favoured  by  its  approach  as  an 
opportunity of regional development and 
the  blockages  of  regionalization  are 
related to its approach as a threat for the 
territorial integrity.  
 
Consequently, our future research efforts will 
focus on identifying and analyzing in detail 
some  models  of  best  practices  that  have 
proven  effective  in  the  EU  for  the  regional 
growth and development. 
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